DOES JJH V JJI EFFECTIVELY BRING BACK UNFAIR DISMISSAL IN SINGAPORE?

Introduction

Singapore has long resisted importing the concept of "unfair dismissal" as understood in the United Kingdom's statutory employment regime.  For decades, a Singapore private sector employer's right to terminate an employment contract by giving contractual notice has been regarded as virtually unfettered — a court's inquiry was limited to whether the contract had been breached, not whether the dismissal was substantively fair. 

This existed hand-in-hand with the statutory wrongful dismissal framework under section 14(2) of the Employment Act 1968 (EA), which asks whether a dismissal was "without just cause or excuse".  Section 14(2) was largely ignored or disregarded, its precise scope and operation remaining untested for decades, because it required employees to file their complaints with the Minister for Home Affairs and no one knew what the procedure and cost involved.

Then the complaint filing procedure changed to allow clear, direct, plentiful and cost-effective recourse to the Employment Claims Tribunals and, more crucially, this year has been an eventful one because for the first time, the Employment Claims Tribunals (ECT) began publishing written grounds of decision and with that came a slew of eye-popping written decisions that have really pushed the boundaries of Singapore employment law beyond anything that Singapore private sector employers and practitioners have seen before.

The ECT's decision in JJH v JJI [2026] SGECT 10, delivered on 12 August 2026 by Tribunal Magistrate Joel Tan, has provoked the question of whether Singapore's employment law is moving — by the side door of implied contractual terms — towards a regime that resembles unfair dismissal in substance, if not in name. This article examines that rather disturbing question.

The Traditional Position: No General Right Against Unfair Dismissal

The starting point under Singapore law has always been contractual.  An employer may terminate an employment contract in accordance with its terms — typically by giving the stipulated notice or paying salary in lieu — and need not justify the commercial or managerial wisdom of the decision.  There is no equivalent of section 94 of the UK Employment Rights Act 1996, which confers upon employees a freestanding statutory right not to be unfairly dismissed, subject to a test of substantive reasonableness in which the tribunal examines the employer's reasons, the fairness of its procedure, and whether dismissal fell within the "range of reasonable responses".

What Singapore does have is the Tripartite Guidelines on Wrongful Dismissal (Guidelines), issued in 2019, which introduced illustrations of circumstances in which a dismissal with notice may be considered wrongful — principally discrimination, deprivation of benefits, and punishment for exercising employment rights — but the Guidelines explicitly stated that "dismissals with notice are presumed not to be wrongful".  The burden of proving wrongful intent rested on the employee.

What changed in 2026: Three Converging Developments

Three decisions delivered in 2026 have substantially altered the way our laws are interpreted.

First, Prashant Mudgal v SAP Asia Pte Ltd [2026] SGHC 15, decided on 21 January 2026, confirmed  that the implied term of mutual trust and confidence (ITMTC) forms part of Singapore employment law, notwithstanding the doubts cast by the Appellate Division of the High Court in the case of Dong Wei v Shell Eastern Trading (Pte) Ltd and another [2022] 1 SLR 1318 and the contrary view taken by the High Court in Dabbs, Matthew Edward v AAM Advisory Pte Ltd [2024] SGHC 260.  The Court held that the term had existed since Cheah Peng Hock v Luzhou Bio-Chem Technology Limited [2013] 2 SLR 577 and would continue to do so unless expressly overruled. 

Importantly, the Court found that considerations of fairness and policy — the relational nature of employment contracts, the power imbalance between employer and employee, and the paramount role of occupation in a person's sense of identity — justified the implication.

Second, JGP v JGQ [2026] SGECT 1, the ECT's first published decision, set out an analytical framework for the section 14(2) inquiry.  It established a two-step test: first, whether the employer's stated reason for dismissal was true; and second, whether the misconduct or ground established was sufficient to justify dismissal (as opposed to a lesser sanction), applying principles of proportionality and parity.  This framework invites the ECT to examine not just whether the employer had a reason, but whether that reason was good enough — a qualitative assessment that echoes the language of fairness rather than pure contractual compliance.

Third, JJH v JJI [2026] SGECT 10 brought together the ITMTC, the duty of care, and the statutory definition of forced resignation under section 2(1) of the EA, to hold that a long-serving employee recovering from stage 3 cancer had been constructively dismissed without just cause or excuse.

The Decision in JJH v JJI

The claimant, JJH, had worked as an administrative assistant in an international school's music department for 17 years. Following cancer treatment, she returned to work with documented medical needs and sought accommodations — light duties, attendance at rehabilitation sessions, and occasional work-from-home arrangements.  The school's response was to demand medical documentation in a prescribed format, reject the substance of medical advice from three healthcare professionals, revoke accommodations abruptly and impose restrictions on rehabilitation attendance.

Tribunal Magistrate Joel Tan found breaches of both the implied duty to take reasonable care of the employee's health and safety, and the ITMTC.  On the former, the Tribunal held that the duty is "open-textured and responsive to circumstances", varies with the particular employee, and cannot be satisfied merely by pointing to compliance with internal policies. Policies must yield to the duty of care when the circumstances demand it.

On the question of forced resignation, the Tribunal articulated a test under section 2(1) of the EA: an employee is "forced" to resign where the employer's conduct has left her "with no practical alternative or choice but to resign, assessed by reference to what it was reasonable to conclude in the circumstances".  This is an objective inquiry, but one that takes account of the employee's particular vulnerabilities and pressures to inform the scope and context of the inquiry

Having found a forced resignation amounting to dismissal, the Tribunal then separately examined whether there was "just cause or excuse" for that dismissal — and held there was not.  The claimant was medically fit for her core duties with reasonable accommodations and the school never genuinely engaged with the question of what those accommodations should look like.

Does This Amount to Unfair Dismissal?

The resemblance to the UK's unfair dismissal regime is undeniable, but it is important to be precise about what JJH v JJI does and does not establish.

What it does establish:

• Substantive review of the employer's conduct: The Tribunal did not confine itself to asking whether the contract had been breached in its express terms. It examined the reasonableness of the employer's response to the employee's medical needs — whether the school acted as an "ordinarily prudent employer" would have, whether it genuinely engaged with the employee, and whether its reliance on policy was proportionate. This is qualitative scrutiny of managerial decision-making. 

• Process matters: The Tribunal emphasised the need for genuine consultation before any decision adverse to an ill employee is made, citing the UK Employment Appeal Tribunal's observations in East Lindsey District Council v Daubney [1977] IRLR 182 with approval.  It found that the school's failure to genuinely consider the claimant's circumstances — arriving at a meeting "already entrenched" in its position, and insisting that the claimant’s return to work be subject to unreasonable and insensitive conditions — was itself a breach of duty of care. 

• The ITMTC as a route to constructive dismissal: By finding that a breach of the duty of care simultaneously breached the ITMTC, the Tribunal effectively created a pathway whereby employees who resign in the face of unreasonable employer conduct can claim they were dismissed — and dismissed without just cause or excuse. 

• A broad conception of "forced" resignation: The section 2(1) test as articulated — no practical alternative, assessed objectively with regard to the employee's circumstances — is deliberately lower than absolute necessity or physical compulsion. It creates a wider gateway to the section 14(2) inquiry under the EA.

What it does not establish:

• A freestanding right against unfair dismissal: The claim in JJH v JJI was anchored in breach of implied terms—the duty of care and the ITMTC. It did not establish that an employer's contractual right to terminate with notice can be challenged merely because the dismissal was substantively unfair.

• A general proportionality requirement for all dismissals: The two-step test in JGP v JGQ applies to the section 14(2) statutory claim, which is available only where the employer has dismissed without just cause or excuse.  An employer that terminates with notice and gives no reason remains presumptively in the clear under the Tripartite Guidelines.

• Appellate authority: Neither Prashant Mudgal nor JJH v JJI is a Court of Appeal decision.  The existence of the ITMTC in Singapore law remains formally an open question at the appellate level, as the ECT in JJF v JJG [2026] SGECT 9 took pains to note.  Employers may yet hope that an appeal will confine or reject these developments.

The Functional Convergence

Despite these doctrinal limitations, the practical effect of JJH v JJI, read alongside Prashant Mudgal and JGP v JGQ, is to create what might be called a functional unfair dismissal regime through three interlocking mechanisms:

• The ITMTC imposes a floor of acceptable employer conduct during the employment relationship and in the lead-up to any termination decision.

• The statutory definition of dismissal in section 2(1) of the EA captures resignations that are the product of employer misconduct, bringing them within the section 14(2) framework.

• The "just cause or excuse" inquiry under section 14(2), as developed in JGP v JGQ, requires not merely a reason, but a proportionate and substantiated reason, with attention to parity and process.

Together, these mechanisms mean that an employer who behaves unreasonably towards an employee — whether in managing ill-health, conducting performance processes, or exercising disciplinary powers — may face a finding that the employee was constructively dismissed without just cause or excuse, even if the employment contract was never technically breached in its express terms.  The employer could have paid notice pay, all CPF contributions, all other benefits per the employment.  Nevertheless, if brought before the ECT, the employee could still receive additional compensation of up to $20,000 (or $30,000 where a union is involved) or reinstatement.  

This is not, in a strict doctrinal sense, unfair dismissal. It does not apply the UK's "range of reasonable responses" test. It does not create a universal right to challenge any dismissal on substantive fairness grounds. It retains the requirement of a breach of an implied term (or a finding that the stated reason is untrue or disproportionate). But to an employer navigating the practical consequences, the distinction may be one without a difference.

Private sector employers will definitely need more structure and guidance than reported cases can give.  What it means for now is that employees losing their jobs in this new AI-driven employment landscape will have more leverage than ever to negotiate better payouts regardless of the circumstances of their departure.